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THE WELFARE STATE, REDISTRIBUTION AND THE 
ECONOMY: RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM, CONSUMER 




Democratic countries with substantial inequality and where people believe that success 
depends on connections and luck induce political support for high tax rates and generous 
welfare states. Traditional wisdom is that such policies harm the economy, but there is not 
much evidence that countries with a large welfare state and substantial redistribution have 
worse economic performance and welfare. One important reason is that governments have 
been careful to invoke the principles of reciprocity and mutual obligations in the design of the 
welfare state. Unemployment benefits conditioned on work experience, no misconduct and 
search effort harm the economy less. Indeed, conditional benefits may even boost 
employment in an economy with efficiency wages. A second reason is that people care about 
relative incomes and become unhappy if others earn and consume much more than they do. 
This explains why people do not seem to get happier, even though societies grow richer and 
richer. With such consumer rivalry the government wishes to correct for the rat race, even if 
there is no need for redistribution, by taxing labour. A third reason is that in modern 
economies many distortions are present and removing one at a time may worsen economic 
performance. Conversely, increasing tax progression in economies with non-competitive 
labour markets induces wage moderation and boosts employment. A final reason is that 
countries with large welfare states typically introduce various progrowth policies as well. 
Keywords: mutual obligations, altruism, relative incomes, happiness, redistributive taxation, 
demand management, second best, design of welfare state. 
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1. Introduction 
The modern welfare state has taken centuries to develop. In early days the priest has played a 
crucial role to convince people to give to the poor. He had to overcome free-rider problems, 
since nobody likes looting and begging by the poor while each citizen would prefer others to 
take care of the poor (de Swaan, 1989). It is relatively easy to break down the welfare state 
and destroy the solidarity that may have taken centuries to build, but much harder to build up 
a welfare state. People are altruistic, particularly to next of kin and others closely related to 
them. The principle of mutual obligations underlying reciprocal altruism is important, even 
though people also display non-reciprocal altruism. People are more willing to help the poor 
if they make an effort and take risks to educate themselves and make a living. Happiness of 
people depends on material living standards, but also on what other people in their reference 
group earn and consume. This may induce a rat race in which people try to keep up with the 
Jones’s and thus work excessively hard in order to keep up with consumption of their peers. 
What do these insights in and determinants of reciprocal altruism, willingness to co-operate 
and happiness imply for the support for redistributive taxation and the size and design of the 
welfare  state?  Are  progressive  taxes  still  a  public  bad?  Are  unemployment  benefits 
necessarily  harmful  for  economic  activity?  We  attempt  to  investigate  what  these  more 
sociological and psychological insights imply for the tax system and the welfare state and 
their consequences for economic performance. In particular, we are interested to examine in 
full political-economic equilibrium what this implies for unemployment and the purchasing 
power of people. We also investigate why the welfare state in Europe has evolved in a very 
different way from the welfare state in the US. The ‘Washington consensus’ maintains that 
liberalising markets and trimming down government is best for economic performance. We 
argue that this is may not be the case in societies with reciprocal altruism and rat races or 
when markets do not clear and unemployment is caused by trade unions, efficiency wage 
and/or search frictions. In that case, progressive taxes and conditional unemployment benefits 
may boost economic performance. 
Section 2 discusses some empirical cross-country evidence that suggests that large 
welfare states do not necessarily imply worse economic performance. Section 3 reviews the 
empirical and experimental literature on altruism, reciprocity and mutual obligations and its 
relevance for the welfare state. Section 4 applies these ideas within the context of efficiency 
wages to explain why higher conditional unemployment benefits may boost employment. 
This example illustrates the importance of mutual obligations in the design of an efficient 
welfare state. Section 5 discusses the determinants of happiness and stresses the importance 
of relative income positions. The resulting rat races result from consumer rivalry. Section 6 
extends the familiar model of redistributive taxation developed by Romer (1975) and Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) to allow for consumer rivalry. The main insight is that, if people care   2 
about their relative income and consumption positions, taxation of labour is warranted even if 
there is no inequity. Since people are competing and thus working too hard in order to keep 
up with others, work adversely affects welfare of the others. The government corrects for this 
distortion by taxing labour (or subsidising labour). If there is inequality among talents and 
incomes, there is an additional motive for taxation. If the median voter is relatively untalented 
and poor, he has a selfish motive to vote for a common subsidy for all financed by a linear tax 
on labour.  Hence, there is a Pigouvian as well as a redistributive motive for taxing labour. 
Section 7 discusses the consequences of consumer rivalry for intertemporal macroeconomics 
and how it might help to explain the need for counter-cyclical demand policies. Section 8 uses 
the theory of second best to give efficiency arguments for progressive taxation. It shows that 
with  unemployment  caused  by  trade  unions,  efficiency  wages  and/or  search  frictions 
progressive  taxation  induces  wage  moderation  and  can  improve  economic  performance. 
Section 9 concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. International evidence on the welfare state 
Taking  an  international  perspective,  Rodrik  (1997)  argues  that  markets  and  the  state  are 
complementary. He questions the supremacy of the idea that social policies are bad for the 
economy (the ' Washington consensus' ). Both governments and markets have their failures but 
they must interact to grapple with the problems of conflicting information and offer the right 
incentives as first-best outcomes in the real world rarely occur. However, Dixit (1996) does 
not see this as proof of the inefficiency of government.  Indeed, weak incentives and the 
various  second-best  constraints  and  prohibitions  may  even  occur  in  a  game  equilibrium 
outcome. Rodrik (1997) thus stresses that the maintenance of social safety nets is not a luxury 
but an essential ingredient of a market economy. The welfare state has the benefit that it helps 
households to insure against uninsurable risks when markets fail due to moral hazard and/or 
moral hazard (e.g., Sinn, 1995; Boadway et al., 2004; Blanchard and Tirole, 2004). Markets 
produce many benefits, but they also make life riskier and more insecure for many people. A 
reliable welfare state thus contributes to a proper functioning of the market economy. Rodrik 
(1998) shows that countries that are more exposed to the risks of international trade have 
bigger  governments,  possibly  because  governments  offer  social  insurance  to  cushion  the 
effects of exposure to external risk. De Grauwe and Polan (2002) show that countries that 
spend most on social security rank highest, on average, in the competitiveness leagues of 
Lausanne' s IMD or of the World Economic Forum. They argue that causation is very unlikely 
to run the other way round, so that the reverse link going from strong competitiveness to a 
stronger economy and more funds for the welfare state is weak. 
  In his path-breaking historical cross-country study Lindert (2004) points out that the 
growth in social spending started in the late nineteenth century after the right to vote was   3 
extended to poorer men and women as well. This is in line with the median voter model 
discussed in section 6.1. It set the stage for Lloyd George’s assault on Britain’s rich just 
before World War I. Extending political voice led in addition to population aging and income 
growth to the emergence of comprehensive nation-wide social insurance programmes and 
more  spending  on  public  education.  The  growth  in  the  post-war  welfare  states  was 
particularly big in countries where the middle and bottom ranks changed places and where 
ethnically homogenous. Lindert also argues that there is almost no evidence of a negative 
effect of a substantial welfare state on gross domestic product. The net national costs of social 
transfers, and the taxes that finance them, are essentially zero. An important reason is that 
governments become more efficient as distortions of higher tax rates are proportionally much 
higher than lower rates. For example, countries with large welfare states tend to have a more 
pro-growth and regressive mix of taxes (think of high taxes on vices and low taxes on capital 
income).  Another  reason  is  that  the  unemployed  caused  by  generous  welfare  states  are, 
typically,  less  productive  and  thus  the  harm  to  national  income  is  limited.  A  more 
fundamental reason is that in advanced market economies with developed welfare states the 
economics of second best apply. As we have seen in sections 4 and 8, the various distortions 
of the welfare state tend to wipe each other out so that the burden of the welfare state is much 
less than simply adding all the distortions one at a time. 
The general picture that emerges from cross-country evidence is that ' laisser faire'  
advocates have something to explain, since neither theory nor empirical evidence suggests 
that social policies necessarily harm the economy. This seems particularly the case if the 
general public does not see redistribution as unfair. The World Values Survey suggests that 
people' s attitudes to the rewards from effort and taking risks are quite different in the US than 
in Europe. Around 30 percent of Americans believe that the poor are trapped in poverty and 
cannot do anything to get out of their miserable situation. Also, 30 percent of Americans 
believe  that  luck,  rather  than  effort  or  education,  determines  income.  In  contrast,  these 
percentages are almost double in Europe. Americans are much more likely to think that the 
poor are lazy and that the rich have become so by hard work and effort. Europeans are much 
more  likely  to  think  that  luck,  family  ties  and  other  connections  matter.  Alesina  and 
Angeletos (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show, using different arguments, that two 
self-fulfilling equilibrium outcomes are possible. There is one equilibrium outcome in which 
there is a lot of redistribution and where people believe that people have become poor or rich 
by  bad  or  good  luck  (Europe).  There  is  another  equilibrium  in  which  there  is  little 
redistribution but where people firmly believe that effort, education, hard work and taking 
risks pay off (the US). This explains why government spending in the US is much lower (30 
per cent of GDP) than in Europe (45 per cent). This difference is remarkable, because pre-tax   4 
inequality is much higher in the US than in Europe, income mobility in the US is not much 
higher than in Europe and tax systems do not seem more efficient in Europe than in the US. 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) argue that the 
older welfare institutions of the US are more conservative and hostile to the welfare state 
whereas  the  proportional  representation  in  much  of  Europe  has  led  to  an  upsurge  of 
communist  and  socialist  parties.  European  countries  are  typically  smaller  and  thus  trade 
unions are more likely to establish powerful positions. They also argue that the US has much 
more racially diversity than Europe and many of the poor in the US are concentrated among 
non-whites. States or countries with racial diversity tend to have low government spending on 
poverty relief, even after correcting for differences in income per head. People are more 
willing to help next to kin and others that are close to them. The growing inflow of migrants 
in Europe will put pressure on the welfare state. 
People are more prepared to sacrifice income by paying higher taxes if the proceeds 
go to people who are laid off, sick or disabled with no fault of their own rather than to people 
who are lazy or have cheated the system. Obviously, this is in line with the arguments in 
favour of high conditional benefits developed in section 4. To put it another way, it is much 
easier  to  build  up  support  for  a  generous  welfare  state  if  the  principle  of  reciprocity  is 
respected, e.g., Fong, Bowles and Gintis (2003). Conversely, people do not mind taxing rich 
people as long as they got rich by luck or connections rather than by hard work. 
  It is important to investigate whether any of these propositions hold up empirically. 
Scandinavian and Dutch experience suggests it is possible to have a low unemployment rate 
and a generous welfare state, but this is not true for all countries. In empirical work it is 
worthwhile  to  contrast  Anglo-Saxon  Europe  characterised  by  its  emphasis  on  Beveridge 
social assistance of last resort for people of working age, weak unions and lots of wage 
dispersion with continental Europe. Continental Europe is characterised by its emphasis on 
extending the coverage of trade unions and the Bismarckian tradition of insurance-based non-
employment benefits such as disability and old-age pensions. It may also be worthwhile to 
distinguish  Nordic  Europe  with  the  highest  levels  of  social  protection,  universal  welfare 
provision,  high  tax  wedges  and  active  labour  market  policy  with  Mediterranean  Europe. 
Mediterranean Europe has, in contrast, strong wage compression, strong unions supported by 
extended  coverage,  employment  protection  and  early  retirement  provisions  (Bertola  and 
Boeri, 2001). It is no good to look for cross-country correlations between spending on social 
policies and unemployment rates, but one should see whether there exist correlations between 
the generosity of various welfare state provisions with wages and unemployment rates. To 
investigate this for the OECD countries is a future challenge. 
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3. Altruism, reciprocity and mutual obligations 
The welfare state in many countries transfers large amounts of resources from the better off to 
the poorer members of society. Remarkable is that politicians have been able to do that with 
the support of even the better off. The theories in favour of redistributive taxation developed 
by economists (e.g., Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981) are, however, based on selfish 
arguments. If there is income inequality, the median voter is likely to be relatively poor and 
vote for populist policies of taxing the rich and subsidising the poor. However, the median 
voter  is  not  necessarily  selfish  and  many  societies  favour  more  altruistic  forms  of 
redistribution. Indeed, many of the rich support income redistribution in favour of the poor 
whereas a substantial number of poor people oppose redistribution. In fact, people are less 
willing to support the poor if they perceive that the poor are lazy and cheat the system or do 
not try hard enough to generate income for themselves. Conversely, people are more willing 
to help the poor if they have been unlucky (cf., Piketty, 1995; Fong, Bowles and Gintis, 2003; 
Bénabou  and  Tirole,  2002;  Alesina  and  Angeletos,  2003).  This  is  related  to  the  idea  of 
procedural fairness and that not only what, but also how matters for utility and fairness (e.g., 
Lind and Tyler, 1988; Frey, Benz and Stutzer, 2003). Non-instrumental determinants of utility 
and a sense of self are thus relevant for making welfare judgements. It is thus relevant how 
people perceive themselves as human beings and how others perceive them. 
If people are poor due to bad luck rather than being lazy, society is more likely to 
support government redistribution.  If people believe, as they do in the US, that willingness to 
take risks and work hard are important for improving one' s economic conditions, electoral 
support for government redistribution is much less.  If people believe that one' s economic 
success is caused by inheritances, corruption, luck and (family) connections, as people do in 
Europe, support for the welfare state is much larger. As mentioned in section 2, there will be 
two equilibrium outcomes: one where people believe that effort pays off and redistribution is 
rather less (the US) and another one where people believe that success depends on luck and 
redistribution  is  more  substantial  (Europe).  Which  equilibrium  one  ends  up,  depends  on 
history. The fact that the US was built by immigrants, who sacrificed a lot and took great risks 
to build up a new life, may explain why people in the US believe that taking risks and hard 
work does and should pay off. To move from the inferior high-redistribution equilibrium is 
not easy and requires large changes in both beliefs and the welfare state. The point is that 
reciprocity matters in the sense that charity depends on the recipient trying to get out of 
welfare by searching hard, retraining if necessary, and taking risks. 
The literature on giving and charity has stressed (impure) altruism or ‘warm glow’, 
i.e., the internal satisfaction that arises from helping other people (e.g., Andreoni, 1989). 
However, the donors are also motivated by gift exchange considerations. Indeed, List and 
Lucking-Reiley (2001) illustrated that increasing seed money or introducing a refund policy   6 
led to a corresponding increase in donations to a university.  Falk (2004) finds that, when a 
charity  accompanies  a  request  for  a  donation  with  a  gift  (postcards  drawn  by  children), 
donations increase significantly. Numerous experiments demonstrate the importance of gift 
exchange and mutual obligations. Fehr and  Falk (1999), Gächter and Falk (2002) and Bewley 
(2004)  use  experimental  evidence  to  suggest  the  relevance  of  reciprocity  for  the  labour 
market. This principle has important implications for the design of the welfare state as well.    
If the welfare state is based on mutual obligations and the principle of reciprocal 
altruism, there may be more support for a generous, yet tough welfare state (e.g., Atkinson, 
1996,  2002;  van  der  Ploeg,  2003).  If  welfare  benefits  are  temporary  and  conditional  on 
searching  hard  enough  for  a  job,  not  rejecting  job  offers,  and  not  having  been  fired  for 
misconduct, the adverse unemployment consequences may be  much less – see section 4. 
Hence, testing welfare benefits and other forms of mutual obligations reduce the dead-weight 
burden of the welfare state. It is tough to be kind, but also kind to be tough. Welfare state 
institutions that support and strengthen reciprocal altruism go a lot further than kin altruism. 
Europe has tried to build up a welfare state based on reciprocal altruism, whereas in the US 
kin altruism and help from the family has traditionally been more important. It is important to 
realise, however, that the human race has a millennium old tradition of sharing food among 
non-kin.  Indeed,  people  have  always  held  deeply  held  norms  of  reciprocity  and  mutual 
obligations to each other. In fact, strong reciprocity may hold which means an urge to co-
operate and share with others even at cost to one self. 
  Experimental evidence based on, for example, dictator games and survey evidence 
suggests  that  many  strangers  willingly  give  to  strangers,  reward  good  deeds,  and  punish 
violations of fairness norms by others even in anonymous one-shot encounters at significant 
cost to themselves (e.g., Ridley, 1997; Fong, Bowles and Gintes, 2003; Layard, 2003). This 
form of ‘true’ altruism with neither present nor future economic rewards for the reciprocator 
is called strong reciprocity and has strong implications for the way modern societies function 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr, Fishbacher and Gächter, 2002). Strong reciprocity cannot be 
explained  from  an  evolutionary  perspective  by  kin  selection,  reciprocal  altruism,  costly 
signalling or indirect reciprocity. These arguments can only explain strong reciprocity by 
maladaptive  behaviour.  In  modern  anonymous  societies  strong  reciprocity  does  not  make 
sense,  but  in  small societies  with  repeated  interactions  it  did.  People  make  ‘mistakes’  in 
modern times, since they are still genetically geared up to the gathering societies of old time. 
However,  Fehr  and  Henrich  (2003)  provide  a  host  of  anthropological,  biological  and 
experimental evidence that counters the maladaptive view of strong reciprocity.  
People display true altruism and/or strong reciprocity, but also favour members of the 
own group over others. People are thus altruistic even to members that are not part of their 
own group at great cost to them selves. This is much stronger than reciprocal altruism. People   7 
are also parochial in the sense that they behave more favourably to those people closer to 
them than to strangers. Although altruism and parochialism each on their own do not seem to 
make sense from an evolutionary perspective, altruism and parochialism or alternatively love 
for members of the own group and hostility to outsiders may have co-evolved. This symbiotic 
evolution of love and hate has been demonstrated with extensive simulations (Bowles, Choi 
and  Hopfensitz,  2003;  Bowles  and  Choi,  2003).  Hence,  smaller  group  sizes,  strong 
institutions for a group and high frequencies of conflict between groups make it more likely 
that  altruistic  modes  of  behaviour  within  the  own  group  survive.  These  insights  have 
profound consequences for the welfare state. It suggests that fighting foreign enemies and 
curtailing immigration of foreigners go hand in hand with altruistic behaviour to unrelated 
members of one’s own people and institutions such as ‘food sharing’ and the welfare state. 
This  view  on  co-evolution  of  love  and  hate  seems  an  essentially  human  phenomenon. 
Cognition, language and other capacities play an essential role in explaining the distinctive 
levels of co-operation among non-kin practised by humans, but one should realise that ants 
also display within-group co-operation at the same time as brood raiding and hostility towards 
neighbouring colonies (e.g., Ridley, 1997, Chapter 9). 
 
4. Conditional unemployment benefits may boost employment 
To illustrate the point that mutual obligations matter, we demonstrate within the context of a 
labour market with efficiency wages that conditional unemployment benefits induce wage 
moderation  and  boost  employment.  In  contract,  unconditional  benefits  always  harm 
employment.  Atkinson  (2002)  stresses  the  importance  of  dealing  properly  with  the 
institutional details of the welfare state. It is not realistic to model unemployment benefits 
merely  as  ‘leisure  pay’.  Benefits  are  neither  indefinite  nor  unconditional  ' income  during 
unemployment' . Most countries require workers to have worked a certain period in order to 
qualify for benefit and do not offer benefits to people who have become unemployed after 
voluntary quits or misconduct. Furthermore, a claimant is only eligible for unemployment 
benefit if he makes a serious effort to search. Typically, one can reject job offers a number of 
times but eventually one must accept a job offer. The duration of unemployment benefits is 
often  limited  to  a  number  of  years.  Afterwards,  unemployed  people  may  get  welfare 
assistance, which is unrelated to the wage one once earned as an employee. In practice, most 
low-skilled workers benefit from welfare more or less indefinitely as eligibility conditions are 
seldom policed. This is especially the case in deep recessions when the chance of finding a 
job is very low. If eligibility conditions can be policed, conditional benefits and active labour 
market policies imply substantial administrative costs. 
  If one treats benefits as indefinite and unconditional income during unemployment, 
one is likely to over-estimate the adverse effects of benefits on unemployment. To understand   8 
why conditional rather than unconditional unemployment benefits may boost employment; 
we modify the no-shirking theory of unemployment and moral hazard developed by Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984). Workers who have been fired for misconduct (shirking) are not entitled to 
an unemployment benefit, but people who get laid off without fault of their own do qualify. 
We  ignore  taxes,  since  our  focus  is  on  demonstrating  the  importance  of  conditional 
unemployment benefits and the no-shirking model is ill suited for addressing the effects of 
changes in the marginal tax rate. Unemployment arises, because the imprecise monitoring 
implies workers have a potential incentive to shirk (moral hazard). Firms avoid shirking by 
paying more than the market-clearing wage. Let s be the exogenous probability of a worker 
leaving job without fault of its own and h the endogenous probability of an unemployed 
person finding a job. Let q be the additional probability of a worker being fired if caught 
shirking. We focus on steady state, so ignore dynamics of unemployment and capital gains in 
the value of non-shirking and shirking workers. Inflow into the pool of unemployed thus 
equals outflow, so that s(1-U)=hU where U is the unemployment rate. The unemployment 
rate U=s/(s+h) increases in the separation rate s and decreases with the probability of finding 
a job h. The (expected) value of a worker who does not shirk is given by: 
 
VW = [W - d + (1-s) VW + s VB]/(1+R) = (W - d + s VB)/(R+s) 
 
where R is the interest (discount) rate and VB is the value of an unemployed person who is 
entitled  to  a  conditional  benefit.  The  value  of  a  worker  equals  the  present  value  of  his 
earnings W minus the disutility of work d plus his expected value next period. Next period he 
is employed with probability 1-s and value VW and unemployed with probability s and value 
VB. On the one hand, the value of a shirker VS is higher than that of a non-shirker because he 
does not suffer the disutility of work. On the other hand, the value of a shirker is lower as he 
has an additional probability q of being caught and dismissed and is then not entitled to the 
conditional unemployed benefit. The value of a shirker can thus be written as: 
 
VS = [W + (1-s-q) VS + s VB + q VU]/(1+R) = (W + s VB + q VU)/(R+s+q) 
 
where VU denotes the value of an unemployed person who has been dismissed for misconduct 
and is not entitled to a conditional benefit. To make sure that employees have on average no 
incentive to shirk, VW ³ VS, firms pay workers just enough to prevent them from shirking: 
 
W ³ R VU  + (R+s+q) d/q - s (VB - VU). 
   9 
The last term on the right-hand side does not appear in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). It shows 
that  firms  need  to  pay  workers  less  to  prevent  them  from  shirking.  Effectively,  denying 
dismissed shirkers a conditional unemployment benefit raises the penalty of misconduct. The 
value of somebody sacked through no fault of his known is: 
 
VB = [B + v + h VW + (1-h) VB]/(1+R) = (B + v + h VW)/(R+h), 
 
where v is utility of leisure and B the conditional unemployment benefit. This equals the 
present value of utility of leisure plus the benefit plus with probability h the value when he 
finds a job and with probability 1-h the value when he remains unemployed next period. The 
value of a dismissed shirker VU is lower than the value of other unemployed, since he is not 
entitled to an unemployment benefit: 
 
VU = [v + A + h VW + (1-h) VU]/(1+R) = (v + A + h VW)/(R+h) < VB < VS £ VW. 
 
where A is the level of unconditional welfare assistance. We use the expressions for VW, VB 
and VU and substitute them into the wage condition. If we also substitute h=s(1-U)/U from the 
labour-market equilibrium condition, we finally obtain the no-shirking condition:  
 
W ³ v + A + d + (R + s/U) d/q - s (B-A)/[R + s (1-U)/U]. 
 
The first three terms on the right-hand side show that the wage a firm needs to pay to prevent 
its workers shirking is higher if utility of leisure v, welfare assistance A and disutility of work 
d are high. The fourth term shows that the firm has to pay workers more to prevent them from 
shirking if the job destruction rate is high, the unemployment rate is low, and the additional 
probability of being detected and dismissed q is small. Hence, if the chance of being caught 
shirking is small or the probability of finding another job is large, the firm has to pay more in 
order to discipline workers. The fourth term explains why the no-shirking condition (NSC) in 
Figure 1 slopes down. Effectively, a lower wage needs to be paid if unemployment is high. 
The final term on the right-hand side is not in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). It shows that a firm 
pays less to prevent its employees from shirking if the conditional unemployment benefit B is 
high relative to the unconditional welfare payment A. The unemployment benefit is granted 
only if the worker has lost his job without fault of his own. A higher sanction for misconduct, 
i.e.,  a  bigger  gap  between  the  conditional  and  the  unconditional  benefit  B-A,  raises  the 
effective penalty of shirking, so firms can afford to pay workers less. Hence, a higher level of 
the conditional unemployment benefit B boosts employment and output. Figure 1 shows that   10
a higher conditional benefit B shifts the no-shirking condition (NSC) down and thus reduces 
the wage, boosts employment and lowers unemployment (move from E to E¢). In contrast, a 
higher unconditional welfare payment A shifts up the no-shirking condition and depresses 
employment. Equilibrium wages are higher than in the competitive outcome C, where wages 
are driven down to the unconditional welfare payment plus utility of leisure plus disutility of 
work.  Equilibrium  unemployment  is  thus  higher  than  in  the  competitive  outcome. 
Unemployment  here  is  akin  to  the  Marxist  idea  of  the  need  to  have  a  reserve  army  of 
unemployed in order to discipline workers.  
 
Wage                                                                                             
 
      NSC'          NSC 
      
                                                                             Labor demand 
                                                          
                                              E                     
                                                           
                                   E¢ 
                                                                                                   
              C 
                                                                                                v+d     
                                                         
                                                                                                   
                                                                                    Unemployment rate 
Figure 1: Higher conditional benefits B reduce shirking and boost employment 
 
A shift from conditional earnings-related benefit to unconditional flat-sum welfare assistance 
(dB=-dA>0) leads to an even bigger drop in the unemployment rate. The penalty for shirking 
increases for two reasons now. First, dismissed shirkers do not get the conditional benefit. 
Second, the unconditional welfare assistance falls and thus stimulates the incentive to work. 
This last incentive to work also increases for people who are unemployed without fault of 
their own. These extra two effects make that the fall in wages and unemployment is much 
greater than with a straight increase in unemployment benefit. If the benefit is financed by 
distortionary taxes there will be offsetting adverse effects on employment and output. 
Unemployment benefits are conditional in other ways as well. They typically last for 
a limited period and unemployed are only eligible if available for work and actively seeking a   11
job.  A  ' rough-and-ready'   way  to  capture  this  is  to  terminate  with  probability  p>0 
unemployment benefits. If there is no sanction for misconduct, the benefit is the same benefit 
irrespective of whether people have been fired for industrial misconduct or not, B=A. The no-
shirking condition becomes: 
 
W  ³  [(R+h)/(R+h+p)] B + d + v + (R + s/U) d/q. 
 
Since  the  unemployment  benefit  no  longer  lasts  forever,  the  penalty  for  shirking  and 
misconduct  is  increased  and  thus  firms  have  to  pay  less  to  prevent  workers  shirking. 
Consequently, employment is higher and the unemployment rate lower. Alternatively, if there 
is a sanction and with probability p>0 the conditional benefit B is terminated and replaced by 
the ever lasting, lump-sum welfare assistance A, the no-shirking condition becomes: 
 
W  ³ v + d + A + (R + s/U) d/q - s (B-A)/[R + p + s (1-U)/U]. 
 
Limiting the duration of a conditional benefit reduces the penalty for shirking and misconduct 
and firms must pay more to ensure workers'  discipline, hence the unemployment rate rises. 
Another modification is that dismissed workers have a smaller probability of finding a job 
than  other  unemployed.  Since  this  raises  the  shirking  penalty,  firms  pay  less  to  prevent 
shirking and equilibrium unemployment is lower. 
In equilibrium nobody shirks, so all unemployed receive conditional unemployment 
benefits. However, with a continuum of heterogeneous workers iÎ[0,1] that differ in their 
disutility of work di, firms set a wage high enough to attract the least ' lazy'  workers and more 
' lazy'  workers do not work: 
 
di  £  {W-A-v+s(B-A)/[R+s(1-U)/U]}/[1+(R+s/U)/q] º d*(W,v,A,B,U;Rq,s). 
 
Firms set the wage to discipline just enough workers, so that 1-U=F[d*(W,v,A,B,U;Rq,s)] 
where F[.] is the cumulative probability density function of di. This yields a similar (NSC)-
schedule as in Figure 1, so the comparative statics are qualitatively the same. However, if 
workers (who are not caught shirking) enjoy protection against firing, a negative shock to 
labour demand after hiring has taken place induces workers with the highest disutility of work 
to stay on the job and shirk rather than quit. Some of them may be caught and end up on 
welfare rather than benefit, so the unemployment pool consists of dismissed shirkers and 
other  unemployed  who  are  entitled  to  a  high  benefit.  A  higher  conditional  benefit  or 
replacement rate still reduces unemployment.   12
One  critique  of  this  result  is  that  the  government  is  unable  to  monitor  perfectly 
whether the employee has been fired for misconduct or the employer and employee are using 
it as an attractive way to stop their relationship. If the government runs the unemployment 
insurance scheme, there are additional problems of moral hazard and incentives to abuse the 
social insurance scheme. If the firm runs the unemployment insurance scheme itself, these 
problems would not arise. 
  The result that higher conditional benefits boost employment may carry over to other 
settings of non-competitive labour markets (Atkinson, 2002, Chapter 4). Also, redundancy 
payments in  a  dynamic  no-shirking  model  induce  firms  to fire  less. This internalises  the 
externality arising from foregone rents imposed by firms on fired workers (Fella, 2000). More 
generally, conditional benefits hurt employment less than unconditional benefits. With search 
frictions a higher benefit harms employment, since those who search for a job are less likely 
to accept lower-wage jobs. In dividing up the surplus of a job match a bigger part of it goes to 
the worker, so wages are higher and employment lower. However, if unemployment benefits 
are of limited duration, unemployed are more likely to accept a job for fear of not finding a 
job and having to fall back on the lower welfare payment. Similarly, the harmful effects on 
employment are attenuated in a search context if the unemployed who want to be eligible for 
a conditional benefit face a work test and can only reject a job offer a maximum of, say, two 
or  three  times.  In  fact,  with  search  in  both  labour  and  product  markets,  a  higher 
unemployment  benefit  induces  firms  to  offer  more  high-wage  jobs  and  may  lower 
unemployment even if the benefit is unconditional in general equilibrium (Axell and Lang, 
1990). 
 
5. Rivalry and happiness: abundance and discontent 
Most of neoclassical economics assumes that people are selfish and only care about income 
and  consumption  in  absolute  terms.  Increasingly,  economists  have  come  to  realise  that 
people’s happiness does not depend on money and absolute levels of consumption alone (e.g., 
van de Stadt, Kapteyn and van de Geer, 1985; van Praag, 1993; Oswald, 1983, 1997; Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002). For example, job satisfaction of a sample of 5,000 British workers is only 
weakly correlated with absolute income, but decreases if reference wages of other comparable 
workers increase (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996). People care about fairness and the degree of 
relative deprivation. Also, a higher level of education requires a higher income to maintain 
the same level of job satisfaction. People feel better if they do better than their peers. For 
example, Oscar winners live four years longer than other nominees who did not win the 
Oscar. Conversely, people that do not score well, feel less happy. This may argue against 
publishing league tables or individual results of school people and students, despite the gains 
from competition that may result from them. There is also evidence to suggest that external   13
rewards destroy intrinsic interest of workers so that they work less when pay stops (e.g., Frey 
and  Oberholzer-Gee,  1997).  Putting  a  money  value  to  everything  may  diminish  intrinsic 
motivation to do well and to help others or make sacrifices for the community. 
Recently, trends in and causes of happiness in the US and Britain have been studied 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2003). Money buys happiness, but well being of people depends 
on relative income as well and is badly affected by unemployment and divorce. For example, 
a lasting marriage rather than widowhood is estimated to be worth $100,000 a year. Well 
being declines up to the age of forty and then rises again. Happiness also depends on how 
friends, partners and family members assess one’s well-being and biological factors such as 
responses  to  stress,  headaches,  digestive  disorders,  duration  of  Duchenne  smiles,  etc. 
Although happiness in Britain has been relatively stable, empirical work shows that during 
the  last  quarter  century  some  people  in  the  US,  especially  white  women,  have  become 
unhappier and others, American men and blacks, have become happier. Abundance resulting 
from economic growth evidently makes some people unhappier and others more content. For 
neoclassical economics with its emphasis on selfishness it is a puzzle why abundance breeds 
discontent (also see Lane, 2000).  
Understanding this puzzle requires one to consider habituation and the importance of 
relative positions for happiness (Layard, 2003). Habituation implies that people quickly adjust 
to higher living standards and find it difficult to adjust downwards. Hence, improvements in 
material living standards make people happy for a while but the effect quickly fades off. Extra 
money does not necessarily make people better off either, because people tend to compare 
their lot with others. For example, Harvard students would rather have $50,000 a year when 
others get half than $100,000 a year when others get double. People do not seem to mind 
having less, as long as others do not do better than themselves. If everybody works hard to get 
more income and spend more, they do not necessarily become happier. The extra income one 
earns makes other people unhappy, so this adverse externality should be corrected for by a tax 
on labour income. Perhaps, the more so as the same Harvard students do not display leisure 
rivalry. Developed societies thus have a tendency to work too hard, consume too much and 
enjoy too little leisure. Chasing material comforts thus does not necessarily lead to happiness 
(cf., Scitovsky, 1976). Humans are social creatures and are happy if relationships with their 
nearest and dearest are good, they live in secure communities that value trust, and they are 
valued by the rest of society (Putnam, 2000). Moving too much in search of a (better) job may 
make people unhappier, since they loose a sense of belonging. A too strong emphasis on 
individualism  and  material  comforts  in  a  society  with  a  lot  of  uncertainty,  geographical 
mobility and little job security (the ' hedonistic treadmill' ) destroys happiness. 
The last fifty years or so much of the developing world has seen a decline in the 
belief in God and in religion. The associated moral code from the bible or whatever seems to   14
have been replaced by promoting unfettered individualism and selfishness. This together with 
invisible hand type of arguments that self-interest is good for society has destroyed the trust 
and more generally the fabric of society and has led to more anxiety among ordinary people. 
In fact, telling people that they should behave in their self-interest seems to destroy their 
willingness to co-operate (Layard, 2003). 
 
6. Consumer rivalry, taxation and selfish redistribution 
6.1. Constant marginal utility of income: Labour is a public bad 
We first assume constant marginal utility of income and abstract from income effects in 
labour supply. Utility of individual i is thus linear in consumption. Since people care about 
their consumption relative to others, utility of individual i is given by: 
 
Ui º Ci - l C + u(Vi),    0<l<1,   u¢>0   and   u²<0, 
 
where  Ci,  C  and  Vi  denote  consumption  of individual  i, average  consumption  across  the 
population and leisure of individual i, respectively. Layard (2003) suggests that l is about 0.3, 
so that people feel worse off if others are able to consume more. People differ. Some are 
quicker at finishing a job and enjoying leisure than others. Total time available to individuals, 
1+qi, varies across the population and can be used for leisure or labour Li. The parameter qi 
stands for innate talent of individual i. We normalise by setting mean time available to 1. 
Time available to the median voter equals 1+qM, so that qM>0 measures inequality in talents 
of different people. The government uses a linear income tax schedule to redistribute income 
from rich to poor individuals. The proportional tax rate is t and the uniform tax credit is 
denoted  by  A.  Individual  i  thus  chooses  consumption,  leisure  and  labour  supply  Li  to 
maximise Ui subject to its budget constraint, Ci = (1-t) W Li + A, and time constraint, Li + Vi 
= 1 + qi. The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption must equal the 
after-tax wage, u¢(Vi)=(1-t)W. Leisure thus falls and labour supply increases if the after-tax 
wage goes up: Vi = v((1-t)W)  and  Li = 1 + qi - v((1-t)W)  with  v¢=1/u²<0. More talented 
people work more hours, earn more and consume more, but they enjoy the same amount of 
leisure as less talented people. This follows from Li = L+ qi, Vi = V and Ci = C + (1-t)Wqi , 
where L, V and C denote mean labour supply, mean leisure and mean consumption. 
The government balances its books, so the tax rate must be high enough to cover tax 
credits and government spending G. Since t WL = A + G, mean consumption can be written 
as C = WL – G = W [1-v((1-t)W)] – G and the utility of individual i as: 
 
Ui = (1-t) W qi + (1-l) {W [1-v((1-t)W)] – G} + u(v(1-t)W)).   15
 
The median voter maximises utility by setting the tax rate equal to: 
 
t = (qM/v¢W) + l. 
 
The  level  of  tax  credits  follows  residually  from  the  government  budget  constraint.  Any 
increase in government spending is fully offset by the decrease in tax credits. With constant 
marginal utility of money income, public goods and tax credits are thus perfect substitutes. If 
the distribution of talents is unequal, i.e., qM > q = 0, the median voter is less talented than the 
voter with average ability. It is thus in the interest of the median voter to redistribute income 
from more talented, richer people to less talented, poorer people. The median voter engages in 
selfish redistribution and votes for a tax schedule with a positive tax credit for all financed by 
a simple proportional tax on wage income. If labour supply is very inelastic, v¢ is small and 
the tax rate is high. This is the Ramsey motive and captured by the first term in the above 
expression for the tax rate (cf.. Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). 
The second term in the expression for the tax rate desired by the majority of the 
electorate  says  that,  if  people  care  about  their  relative  consumption  position,  taxation  of 
labour is a good thing even if talents are equally distributed, that is if qM = 0 (cf. Layard, 
2003). Since people compete with each other to consume  more than their neighbours do 
(‘keeping up with the Jones’s), they work too hard from a social perspective. It thus makes 
sense to correct for this externality and to tax labour to make room for a happier society with 
more leisure and less consumption. This suggests that the tax rate is at least 30 per cent and 
even  higher  if  the  median  voter  is  relatively  less  well  off  and  cares  about  selfish 
redistribution. The tax rate is thus the sum of a Pigouvian term to correct for the consumption 
rat race and a redistributive term to correct for talent and income inequality. 
 
6.2. Non-constant marginal utility of income: the Veblen-effect 
Many people seek status by trying to distinguish themselves from others and aspiring to 
consume as much as the rich (Veblen, 1899/1934; Bourdieau, 1979). The consumption of the 
rich  thus  affects  marginal  utility  of  consumption  of  the  less  well  off  (e.g.,  Bagwell  and 
Bernheim,  1996;  Corneo  and  Olivier,  1997).  To  allow  non-constant  marginal  utility  of 
income, we assume Ui = U(Ci - lC, Vi). Higher consumption by others in society reduces 
utility and increases the marginal utility of consumption. We assume homothetic preferences, 
so  that  leisure  and  consumption  are  complements  (UCV  >0).  Since  the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution between relative consumption and leisure must equal the after-tax wage, we have 
Vi = v((1-t)W) (Ci - lC) where v¢=UC/[UVV–(1-t)WUCV]<0. Together with the time constraint   16
and the household budget constraint, we obtain labour supply, leisure and consumption of 
individual i and mean labour supply L: 
 
Li = L + w((1-t)W) qi,    Vi = 1 – L + [1-w((1-t)W)] qi  
 
Ci = w((1-t)W) {(1-t)W [1 + qi + l v((1-t)W) C] +A} 
 
L = w((1-t)W) [1 + v((1-t)W) (l C – A)] 
 
where  0<w((1-t)W)º1/[1+(1-t)Wv((1-t)W)]<1  with  w¢=(s-1)w
2  and  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between leisure and consumption is defined as sº-(1-t)Wv¢/v>0. More talented 
individuals work more hours, earn more and consume more than the average individual. They 
also have more leisure, so they work harder and have more fun. If average consumption rises, 
each individual wants to keep up and consumes more as well. A higher tax credit raises 
income, so induces more leisure, lower labour supply and higher consumption. A higher tax 
rate (or lower after-tax wage) has two effects: it reduces income and induces people to work 
harder and it makes leisure cheaper relative to goods consumption and thus lowers labour 
supply. If the second effect dominates the first effect, the substitution effect is more important 
than the income effect and conventional labour supply slopes upward (s>1 and w¢>0).  
The government budget constraint, tWL=G+A, gives the reduced-form expressions 
for average consumption and average labour supply: 
 
C = WL - G = (W - G)/[1 + (1-l) W v((1-t)W)] 
L = [1 + (1-l) v((1-t)W) G]/ [1 + (1-l) W v((1-t)W)]. 
 
Higher public spending crowds out private consumption and induces people to take more 
leisure and work harder on average. Utility of the median voter is given by: 
 
UM = U[(1-l)C+(1-t)Ww((1-t)W) qM, 1-L+{1-w((1-t)W)} qM]. 
 
Society chooses the tax rate that maximises utility of the median voter.  
The effect of aggregate consumption on hours worked is positive. People work harder 
in  order  to  try  to  emulate  the  consumption  standards  of  the  rich.  Hence,  in  a  world  of 
conspicuous consumption working hours are higher if the degree of income inequality is 
higher. This seems to be the reflected in the data as hours worked have fallen steadily in 
Europe while consumption inequality has diminished (Bowles and Park, 2002). To reach a   17
social  welfare  optimum  with  such  forms  of  consumer  rivalry  may  require  progressive 
consumption taxes or subsidising the leisure of the rich. One may wonder why people try to 
emulate the consumption standards of the better off rather than emulate the standards of 
people with more leisure. Veblen suggested that the cash one needs to buy consumption is a 
more visible display of distinction than enjoying more leisure than others do. 
 
6.3. Sociological and economic views on redistribution 
Another utility specification Ui = s u(Ci - lC) + (1-s) U(Ci) + v(Vi), with u¢, v¢, U¢>0 and u², 
U² £ 0, nests the ‘economic’ model with s=0 and the ‘sociological’ model with s=1 as special 
cases (Clark and Oswald, 1998). Large values of s capture the idea that human beings have a 
deep wish to conform to others in their consumption patterns, but do not wish to emulate the 
leisure  afforded  by  others.  This  sociological  element  suggests  that  humans  constantly 
compare themselves to others and feel good when they out-perform their peers. With small 
values of s preferences are private and selfish and people do not look that much over their 
shoulders to see what others are up to. It can be shown that consumption of any individual 
goes up after a rise in the consumption of others if v²<0, that is if the utility function of 
relative consumption is concave. Hence, comparison-concave utility is required for people to 
mimic other people’s consumption patterns. Conversely, if v²>0, consumption declines if 
consumption of others goes up. This obviously leads to deviant behaviour. If v(.) is linear, 
people’s consumption patterns are independent of those of others. If utility is linear in own 
consumption, i.e., U²=0, consumption of any individual follows consumption of any other 
individual one for one. 
 
7. Consumer rivalry in intertemporal macroeconomics 
In dynamic economies it is important to be precise about the nature of consumer externalities. 
Typically, utility of any individual depends positively on its own consumption but also on 
some  reference  or  aspiration  level  of  consumption.  This  reference  or  aspiration  level  of 
consumption may simply be average consumption in the population (or consumption of ‘other 
people’) or, alternatively, may be a geometric average of past levels of average consumption. 
Dupor and Liu (2003) define two basis types of consumption externalities. The first one is 
based on jealousy effects, which requires that the utility of an individual drops if other people 
consume more. The second relates to keeping up or catching up with the Jones’s and requires 
that the marginal utility of consumption of an individual increases if other people consume 
more.  The latter  is  particularly  important  for  asset  price  consideration  and in  theories  of 
economic  growth,  while  jealousy  effects  are  crucial  for  consumption  allocations.  Many 
studies use utility functions that display both envy and keeping up with the Jones’s. Most of   18
these studies show that such consumption externalities require the government to step in with 
the  use  of  distortionary  taxes  in  order  to  reach  the  first-best  optimum  (e.g.,  Boskin  and 
Sheshinski, 1978; de la Croix and Michel, 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Abel, 2003). 
 
7.1. Keynesian demand management and catching up with the Jones’s 
Consumer  externalities  are  prevalent  in  the  real  world  and  have  drastic  implications  for 
intertemporal  macroeconomics.  Since households  fail to  internalise the adverse  effects  of 
consuming more themselves on other households who have to engage in a rat race to keep up 
consumption, competitive markets fail to yield the first-best outcome and there is a need for 
government intervention. Consider an intertemporal macroeconomic model with consumption 
externalities and driven by technology shocks, but without capital accumulation. Ljungqvist 
and Uhlig (2000) show that, if consumer externalities take the form of catching up with the 
Jones’s, counter-cyclical demand management is needed to restore the first-best outcome in 
competitive equilibrium. The instrument to correct for the consumer externality is a pro-
cyclical tax on labour. The labour tax rate is increased to cool down an over-heated economy 
caused by a positive productivity shock. In a boom households chase each other into a rat race 
where they work and consume too much, so the government must step in to end this rat race. 
In  contrast,  in  a  depression  the  tax  rate  on  labour  should  be  cut  in  order  to  bolster 
consumption  when  households  are  caught  together  in  a  negative  spiral.  Despite  a  purely 
competitive, market-clearing general equilibrium framework, there is nevertheless a role for 
counter-cyclical Keynesian demand management to correct for the external effects caused by 
catching up with the Jones’s. All households are assumed to be the same, so there is no need 
to consider redistributive taxation. Let expected utility of household i be given by 
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where 0<b<1 is the discount factor and n>0 stands for the disutility of work. The aspiration 
level of consumption X is a geometric average of past average consumption levels: 
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where 0£l<1 and 0£f<1. Each household faces a tax rate on labour income of t and receives 
a lump-sum transfer A of the government. The government budget is balanced each period. In 
symmetric equilibrium Cit=Ct and Lit=Lt. Output is proportional to average labour input, that 
is Yt=qtLt, and productivity qt follows the stochastic process:   19
 




where 0£y<1 and et is i.i.d. with zero mean and bounded below by et>-1. The stochastic 
process is approximately the same as an AR(1) process for log(qt). Households consume a lot 
if the aspiration level of consumption in society is high, the tax rate is low, productivity is 
high and their dislike of work is low: 
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Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) show that the first-best allocation and consumption level 
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can be achieved by the following tax rate: 
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The steady-state tax rate is given by t¥=lb(1-f)/(1-bf). It follows that the optimal tax policy 
impacts the economy counter-cyclically via pro-cyclical taxes. The tax rate varies positively 
with productivity. This counter-cyclical form of Keynesian demand management corrects for 
the externalities induced by catching up with the Jones’s. 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) also study consequences of nonlinear forms of catching-
up-with-the-Jones’s  effects  as  used  by  Campbell  and  Cochrane  (1999).  Since  the  surplus 
consumption ratio exhibits increasing returns to scale, the social planner can increase the well 
being  of  individuals  by  generating  welfare-enhancing  consumption  cycles  in  otherwise 
stationary  environments.  They  find  that  the  parameter  values  of  Campbell  and  Cochrane 
(1999) suggest very high tax rates on labour. Lettau and Uhlig (1995) show that introducing 
catching-up-with-the-Jones’s in economies with capital accumulation has the implication that 
consumption is excessively smooth in competitive equilibrium.  
 
7.2. PAYG and capital income taxes in OLG economies with consumer rivalry 
Liu and Turnovsky (2002) show in a framework of neoclassical growth with infinitely-lived 
households and inelastic labour supply that the steady-state return on capital is unaffected by   20
consumption externalities. This result is not robust and does not hold in economies with 
overlapping  generations  and  finitely-lived  households.  Abel  (2003)  therefore  analyses  a 
dynamic competitive economy with overlapping generations and capital formation and also 
introduces a benchmark level of consumption into the utility function of individuals. The 
socially optimal balanced growth path is characterised by the same modified golden rule as in 
standard neoclassical growth models. However, the concern for consumption relative to the 
benchmark  or  aspiration  level  of  consumption  imposes  an  optimality  condition  on  the 
allocation  of  consumption  across  generations  that  are  simultaneously  alive.  Without 
consumption externalities the first-best optimum in the standard neoclassical economies with 
overlapping generations can be obtained with a balanced-budget lump-sum intergenerational 
transfer scheme. A pay-as-you-go form of social security can thus be used to achieve the 
appropriate level of saving and the modified golden rule. If consumers also care about a 
benchmark level of consumption, the government needs an additional tool to achieve the first-
best optimum. This requires a distortionary tax on capital income. When the social planner is 
more  patient  than  individual  households, the  transfer  scheme  typically  transfers  from  the 
current young to the current old (Abel, 2003). In that case, the optimal rate on capital income 
must be positive. This is surprising, since one would expect a more patient social planner to 
subsidise capital in order to raise the capital-labour ratio. However, a more patient social 
planner also favours later, i.e., younger, generations and can do this by taxing capital income 
at a positive rate. 
 
7.3. Equity premium riddles explained by consumer rivalry 
Catching up with the Jones’s and various forms of consumer rivalry have been the focus of 
considerable attention in the asset pricing literature (e.g., Abel, 1990). Such envy effects may 
explain the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). The idea is to allow one’s 
own marginal utility from an additional unit of consumption to be higher if one observes that 
other people consume more. This can happen immediately, i.e., keeping up with the Jones’s 
(e.g., Gáli, 1994), after a lag, i.e., catching up with the Jones’s (cf., Campbell and Cochrane, 
1999), or using a variant based on habit formation (e.g., Constantinides, 1990). All variants 
rely on the by now familiar consumption externality, so that households do not take account 
of the unhappiness they cause to others if they themselves consume more. Through this route 
one can shed new light on the puzzle that equity seems to consistently demand a much higher 
rate of return than bonds than would be warranted by any reasonable degree of risk aversion. 
 
8. Merits and costs of progressive taxation 
Increasingly, economists have come to realise that people’s happiness does not depend on 
money and absolute levels of consumption alone – see section 5. If everybody works hard to   21
get more income and spend more, they do not necessarily become happier. The extra income 
one earns makes other people unhappy, so this adverse externality should be corrected for by 
a progressive tax on labour income. People engage in wasteful rat races which leave less 
room  for  leisure  and  provide  additional  grounds  for  progressive  taxes  (Akerlof,  1976). 
Developed societies have a tendency to work too hard, display rat races, consume too much 
and enjoy too little leisure. Efficiency can be improved with a progressive tax system in 
second-best economies. This is interesting, because the neo-liberal agenda (the ‘Washington 
Consensus’) stresses the harmful effects of progressive taxes on incentives and economic 
activity. 
 
8.1. Unemployment and progressive taxation 
Economies  experience  ' real'   unemployment,  not  leisure  or  holidays  disguised  as 
unemployment. Involuntary unemployment is prevalent in capitalist societies. Markets fail or 
disappear if there are legal restrictions, institutional rigidities, high transaction costs, external 
effects, adverse selection and moral hazard problems arising from asymmetric information, 
and/or imperfect competition. In the real world prices do not equal marginal costs and labour 
is paid more than its marginal product. Rents are shared between employers and employees. 
Wages are typically set by trade unions, by firms or in negotiations between workers and 
firms rather than as the outcome of clearing labour markets. In such a second-best world 
reducing one distortion does not necessarily improve welfare. The distortion arising from a 
more progressive tax system may offset the distortions from imperfect labour markets. 
Substantial parts of the labour force are unionised. In some countries trade union 
agreements are legally extended to all workers, thus making the power of trade unions even 
stronger.  Monopoly  trade  unions  have  sufficient  monopoly  power  to  set  wages  for  its 
members given knowledge of the labour demand curve. Firms subsequently take the wage set 
by the monopoly union as given when maximising profits. With right to manage, unions 
bargain with firms over the wage, but not the employment level. This does not change results 
very much, because the outcome is still on the labour demand curve. We assume middle-sized 
trade unions, big enough to set wages but too small to internalise adverse effects of higher 
wages on prices and purchasing power of members. The unions are also too small to bargain 
with the government over taxation, benefits, childcare, pensions, training and other matters 
that  may  concern  employees.  Unions  thus  do  not  internalise  the  government  budget 
constraint. Their welfare is captured by a utilitarian welfare function. 
  Firms face a concave production function Y=F(L), where Y denotes output and L 
employment. Profit maximisation implies firms set marginal productivity of labour to the real 
producer  wage,  F' (L)=(1+TL)W  where  TL  is  the  employers’  tax  rate.  Demand  for  labour 
decreases with the producer wage. The union operates under a Rawlsian ' veil of ignorance'    22
and maximises L v(WA) + (N-L) v(B), subject to the labour demand curve, where v' >0, v' ' <0, 
B is the unemployment benefit, N-L the number of unemployed and WA the after-tax wage. 
This yields the union wage mark-up: 
 
[v(WA) - v(B)]/[WA v' (WA)]  =  S/eD 
 
where Sº(1-TM)/(1-TA) is the measure of residual income progression, TA the average income 
tax rate, TM the marginal income tax rate and eD the wage elasticity of labour demand. The 
left-hand  side  gives  the  difference  in  utility  of  an  employed  and  an  unemployed  union 
member, converted from utility into production units, and expressed as fraction of the after-
tax wage. The right-hand side indicates that, given the unemployment benefit, the mark-up is 
particularly large and unemployment high if the wage elasticity of labour demand eD is low. 
Also, given the unemployment benefit, the mark-up falls and employment rises if the tax 
system becomes more progressive (lower S). With a unit coefficient of relative aversion the 
union mark-up is WA=exp(S/eD) B. The unemployment benefit sets a ' floor'  in the after-tax 
wage, so higher benefit immediately translates into a higher wage and lower employment. For 
a given degree of tax progression, a higher average income tax rate TA leaves the after-tax 
wage  unaffected  and  thus  the  pre-tax  wage  rises.  The  after-tax  wage  displays  real  wage 
rigidity, hence the full burden of the labour income tax is borne by firms. A higher payroll tax 
also leaves the after-tax wage unaffected, so labour costs rise and employment falls. 
If  unemployed  union  members  do  not  rely  on  unemployment  benefit,  but  have 
probability  1-U  of  finding  a  job  and  probability  U  of  being  on  the  dole  with  U  the 
unemployment  rate,  then  expected  outside  income,  WO=(1-U)WA+U(B+I),  is  the  relevant 
alternative income and not the benefit B. Here I stands for (utility of leisure or) untaxed 
informal income. Since WA-WO=U(WA-B-I), the income differential of a union job increases 
if the differential between the after-tax wage and the benefit plus informal income is high and 
if the chance of falling back on the dole is high (i.e., if unemployment is high). With risk-
neutral preferences we obtain the equilibrium unemployment rate: 
 
U = (S/eD) /[1 - (B/WA) - (I/WA)]. 
 
Equilibrium unemployment is high if replacement ratios for benefits rºB/WA and informal 
incomes are high, the tax system is not so progressive and labour demand is fairly inelastic. 
If benefits are indexed to after-tax wages and informal incomes are indexed to before-tax 
wages,  rIºI/W,  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate  U=(S/eD)/[1-r-(rI/(1-TA)]  rises  if  the 
replacement rates for benefits and informal incomes rise and the average tax rate rises. If   23
benefits or informal incomes are not indexed to after-tax wages, the above gives a wage 
setting equation in which the wage rises with both the level of employment and the benefit. 
Together with the labour demand curve, one can solve simultaneously for employment and 
the wage. Although cuts in payroll taxes do not affect the unemployment rate if benefits are 
indexed  to  after-tax  wages  and  informal  incomes  are  absent,  they  raise  the  wage,  boost 
employment and reduce the unemployment rate if benefits are not indexed (cf. Bovenberg and 
van der Ploeg, 1994; Pissarides, 1998). Hence, if benefits are not indexed to after-tax wages 
or the unemployed enjoy untaxed, informal income, the wage setting equation is flatter and 
payroll taxes boost employment by cutting the replacement rate and increasing the incentive 
to work - see Figure 2. Another way of putting it is that the effects of a higher average labour 
tax depend on whether the unemployed escape the burden of taxation. There is no increase in 
unemployment if the unemployed share fully in the higher tax burden, i.e., if the outside 
option  is fully  taxed  and the  net  replacement  rate  is  not  increased.  Of  course,  it  is  then 
debatable whether this is a very social policy. In practice, it is unlikely that the unemployed 
share fully in the tax burden. Unemployed people enjoy untaxed leisure and income in the 
informal economy, so that a higher average tax rate on labour destroys jobs. 
  






















Figure 2: Indexation of benefits and incidence of taxes in non-competitive labor markets 
 
The  result  that  with  a  fixed  after-tax  replacement  rate  a  more  progressive  tax  system 
moderates wages and boosts employment and output also holds with ' right to manage'  where 
the  wage  follows  from  a  Nash  bargain  between  unions  and  firms  and  employment  is 
subsequently set by firms. The ratio of the wage bargaining outcome to outside income is   24
again high if labour demand is fairly inelastic and the degree of tax progression is small. In 
addition, the wage is high if the ' ability to pay'  (as measured by the share of profits relative to 
that of wages) is high and the bargaining power of firms relative to that of unions is relatively 
weak. Also, imperfect competition in product markets lowers the wage elasticity of labour 
demand and bolsters the power of trade unions. Koskela and Vilmunen (2002) extend the 
results to efficient Nash bargaining between firms and unions.  
If  unemployment  benefits  are  indexed  to  after-tax wages  and  unemployed  people 
share fully in the tax burden, changes in labour taxes do not affect unemployment and are 
fully  borne  by  workers.  However,  Graafland  and  Huizinga  (1999)  give  evidence  for  the 
Netherlands that the tax rate adversely affects unemployment even after correcting for the 
effects of changes in the net replacement rate. Also, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) provide 
empirical  evidence  that  changes  in  labour  taxes  are  strongly  correlated  with  changes  in 
unemployment rates, particularly for European countries with substantial unionisation and 
less so for the Nordic European countries with centralised trade unions. One reason is that 
unemployed people also enjoy untaxed, informal incomes and enjoy utility of untaxed leisure. 
In  that  case,  the  true  replacement  rate  is  not  constant  and  a  higher  tax  wedge  boosts 
unemployment even if productivity growth must be consistent with stationary unemployment 
(Bovenberg  and  van  der  Ploeg,  1994,  1998;  Sørensen,  1997;  Bovenberg,  2003).  These 
insights  also  hold  for  an  open  economy  with  international  capital  mobility  and  constant 
returns to scale in production. With interest rates set on world markets the producer wage is 
pinned down by the factor price frontier. A higher replacement rate or less progressive tax 
system then reduces the demand for capital from abroad and the demand for labour but leaves 
the producer wage unaffected. The end result is the same: more unemployment. 
With efficiency wages firms pay relatively high wages to recruit, retain and motivate 
workers. Abilities and effort of workers are hard to monitor for a firm. However, by paying a 
bit more than elsewhere, firms counteract adverse selection by improving the average quality 
of the workforce. Paying a ' fair'  wage also reduces work disruption and raises morale and 
work effort. When effort by workers in firm i depends on differences in indirect utility in 
work and out of work,  
 
Ei = [v(WAi) - v(WO)]
e    with   WO º U(B+I) + (1-U) WA = {1 - [1-(B+I)/WA] U}WA 
 
where e>0, WAi  is the after-tax wage of a worker in firm i, relative wages matter. Effort 
increases if the chance of unemployment and a large drop in income is high, that is if the 
unemployment rate U is high and replacement rate low. Output of firm i, Yi= Ei Li, rises with   25
efficiency and volume of labour. Firm i sets its wage to maximise profits, [Ei - (1+TL) Wi] Li, 
This yields: 
[v(WAi) - v(WO)]/[WAi v' (WAi)]  =   e S. 
 
Firm i sets relatively high wages if the efficiency wage or leapfrogging effect e is strong and 
the tax system is not very progressive. Less risk-averse workers require firms to pay more to 
recruit, retain and motivate workers. Again, more tax progression reduces the wage mark-up. 
Firms have in the margin less incentive to offer higher wages if the government grabs a 
bigger  slice  of  the  wage  rise.  With  risk-neutral  preferences  we  obtain  in  symmetric 
equilibrium: 
U = e S/[1 - r - rI /(1-TA)]. 
 
rºB/WA  and  rIºI/W.  More  leapfrogging  (higher  e),  a  higher  replacement  rate,  a  less 
progressive tax system (higher S) and, with untaxed informal income, a higher average labour 
tax  rate  induce  higher  unemployment.  More  risk  aversion  among  workers  also  lowers 
unemployment.  More  tax  progression  boosts  employment  and  output  and  reduces 
unemployment, since it is less attractive to pay high wages and to leapfrog other firms and for 
workers to do their best. Hence, labour productivity and the pre-tax wage fall. This contrasts 
with competitive labour markets, where more progressive taxes destroy incentives to work 
more hours and lower employment and output. Indeed, if we allow for optimal choice of 
hours worked and efficiency wages, a more progressive tax system lowers labour supply per 
household (i.e., reduces hours worked per job) which generates upward wage pressure. Total 
demand for labour will not rise as much and may even fall. The number of jobs will rise albeit 
that each job has shorter working hours. Of course, the size of the national income need not 
necessarily rise. 
  If  unemployment  benefits  are  indexed  to  after-tax  wages  (r  fixed)  and  informal 
income is absent, a higher average income tax rate TA or payroll tax TL does not affect 
unemployment again. However, if benefits or informal incomes are not indexed to after-tax 
wages, the unemployment rate decreases as after-tax wages rise and one needs 
 
log(W) = [1/(1-e)] [e {log(S) - TA} - TL]   and   log(WA) = [1/(1-e)] [e log(S) - TA - TL]. 
 
to assess the incidence of taxes and the effects on unemployment. A rise in taxation keeping 
the degree of tax progression unchanged, raises marginal and average tax rates together and 
lowers the pre-tax wage. After-tax wages fall by more than 100 per cent and thus workers 
bear more than 100 per cent of the tax burden. These results differ from under a monopoly   26
union, since there firms rather than workers carried the burden of labour income taxation as 
now firms rather than unions set wages. If unemployed benefits are not indexed to after-
wages or the unemployed enjoy untaxed income, a higher average labour income or payroll 
tax depresses after-tax wages more than 100 per cent, raises the replacement rate and thus 
increases the unemployment rate. The beneficial effects of a more progressive tax system, i.e., 
wage moderation and a lower unemployment rate, are less if benefits are not indexed to after-
tax wages, because then the replacement rate is pushed up by the fall in after-tax wages. 
Clearly, the welfare state components can not be seen in isolation. 
More  generally,  we  show  that,  if  the  unemployed  do  not  escape  the  burden  of 
taxation, changes in the average labour tax rate do not affect the unemployment rate or the 
producer wage. However, if unemployment benefits are not fully indexed to after-tax wage 
income or the unemployed enjoy untaxed, informal income, the unemployed escape part of 
the burden of taxation. In that case, a higher tax rate on labour pushes up unemployment and 
wages. In non-Walrasian settings there is a surplus to be divided between firms and workers. 
Progressive taxes then tilt the balance in favour of less purchasing power and more jobs. This 
explains why in many econometric estimates of wage equations higher average tax rates give 
rise to upward wage pressure while higher marginal tax rate induce downward wage pressure 
(e.g., Lockwood and Manning, 1994). 
 
8.2. Other efficiency grounds for progressive taxation 
In  the  presence  of  trade  union  power,  efficiency  wage  and/or  search  frictions,  a  more 
progressive tax system thus tends to moderate wages and boost employment (e.g., Bovenberg, 
2003; van der Ploeg, 2003). The boost to the number of jobs may be enhanced, since a more 
progressive tax system typically reduces the number of hours worked per employee. Sørensen 
(1999) shows that a union, concerned with employment of its members, restricts working 
hours below the level which the individual employed member would prefer at the going after-
tax wage. Since tax progression drives an additional wedge between the marginal disutility of 
work  and  the  marginal  productivity  of  labour,  hours  worked  per  worker falls  and labour 
supply  is  further  distorted.  Wage  moderation  boosts  employment,  i.e.,  the  total  hours  of 
labour demanded by firms. Together with the induced shorter working week this boosts the 
total number of jobs in the economy. Labour supply effects thus remain important in non-
Walrasian labour markets and, a priori, it is not clear what happens to unemployment. We 
need to closely examine the evidence from micro-econometric studies, since some agents may 
face high marginal tax rates and exhibit elastic labour supply (Bovenberg, 2003). In any case, 
it is better to focus on the employment effects, which also seems more relevant in the analysis 
of  problems  arising  from  ageing  of  the  population.  Cross-country  comparisons  of 
employment are also easier for statistical reasons.   27
Many politicians are concerned about the unequal distribution of labour within the 
family.  Men  typically  work  more  hours  on  the  labour  market  than  women,  but  do  less 
shopping, childcare and other household chores. A more progressive tax system has, if the tax 
system  is  individualised,  the  added  benefit  that  the  partner  who  works  most  hours  is 
stimulated to work less while the other partner is encouraged to work more hours on the 
labour  market.  Hence,  a  more  progressive  tax  system  can  contribute  to  a  more  equal 
distribution of labour between men and women in the family. 
Failing  capital  and  insurance  markets  may  also  provide  efficiency  grounds  for 
progressive  taxation  (e.g.,  van  Ewijk,  et  al.,  2003).  Future  labour  income  is  usually  not 
accepted by commercial banks as a guarantee for a loan, since people cannot be forced to 
work and pay back in future. Problems of adverse selection imply that good risks do not 
borrow, thus the bad risks remain. As a result, interest rates go up and credit is rationed 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). People thus are unable to borrow when they are young and to 
smooth consumption over their life cycle. Progressive taxes redistribute incomes from people 
that are old and earn a lot to people that are young and do not earn a lot. In this sense, a 
progressive tax system acts as an implicit credit market and alleviates some of the distortions 
of rationed credit markets (Hubbard and Judd, 1986). Rationing of credit particularly hurts 
students with poor parents. This is bad for society, since the full potential of human capital 
remains underdeveloped. Since a progressive tax system also redistributes from rich to poor 
parents, it partially alleviates adverse effects of credit rationing on schooling (Jacobs, 2003). 
Insurance markets fail to fully insure the risks of loosing income if people become ill, 
disabled or unemployed. People typically have a better knowledge of their own chances of 
becoming ill, disabled or unemployed than insurance companies. The good risks thus leave 
the market and the insurance companies are left with the bad risks. Insurance premiums go 
up; some insurance markets may stop functioning altogether (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). 
As a result, people engage in less risk jobs and activities. Since a progressive tax system also 
redistributes income from people with good luck to people with bad luck, it also corrects to a 
certain extent for failing insurance markets (cf., Sinn, 1995). A progressive tax system also 
encourages risk-averse people to invest in risky studies (e.g., Eaton and Rosen, 1980). 
We have given a large number of arguments why social policies and redistributive 
taxation may alleviate non-tax distortions in second-best economies, but social policies such 
as  progressive  taxation  also  exacerbate  non-tax  distortions  and  may  reduce  output.  They 
distort markets, reduce the incentive to work and can exclude many people from the labour 
markets.  If  unemployment  benefits  are  taxed  or  the  unemployed  enjoy  untaxed,  informal 
income, tax progression raises the effective net replacement rate and can thus induce wage 
pressure and destroy jobs. If labour supply is endogenous, the effect of progressive taxation 
on employment is ambiguous. The effects on wage moderation and on hours worked typically   28
work in opposite directions. Tax progression may harm the incentive to invest in training and 
human capital, so that it may lower the productivity of the economy. Tax progression also 
encourages  tax  evasion,  reduces  working  hours,  lowers  productivity  by  reducing  the 
employers'  optimal efficiency wage relative to the level of unemployment benefit, and lowers 
the efficiency of the job matching process by reducing workers'  expected marginal return to 
job search. Even if employment rises with more tax progression, output may fall and finance 
of a generous welfare state may become more difficult. Conversely, a by-product of a less 
progressive tax system is that some low-wage earners may face higher average and marginal 
tax rates. Since low-wage earners are likely to have relatively elastic labour supplies, OECD 
(1995) argues that the efficiency costs of taxation may actually increase rather than decrease. 
Sørensen (1999), Røed and Strøm (2002), and Bovenberg (2003) point out that there 
is an optimal degree of tax progression. It is an empirical matter to find out whether the 
efficiency grounds for social policies dominate the costs of market distortions. However, the 
case for social policies is greater in economies plagued by many non-tax and non-benefit 
distortions. 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
Countries with large welfare states and substantial redistribution do not seem to have much 
worse economic performance. This is a puzzle for advocates of the ‘Washington consensus’. 
We stressed reciprocal altruism, mutual obligations and second-best as important factors to 
bear in find when designing the welfare state and redistributive tax schemes. In particular, we 
provided  an  example  of  an  economy  with  efficiency  wages  where  higher  conditional 
unemployment  benefits  boosted  job  growth  while  higher  unconditional  benefits  (welfare) 
depressed job growth. We also showed that more tax progression induces wage moderation in 
non-competitive  labour  markets  with  trade  unions  and/or  efficiency  wages.  Effectively, 
modern market economies with large welfare states are riddles with distortions. Many of 
these distortions cancel out against each other, so the economics of second best applies. Also, 
welfare  is  hardly  ever  given  unconditionally.  Governments  understand  the  principle  of 
reciprocity and mutual obligations. They also know how to deal with problem of second best 
when they design the welfare state. These are the reasons why there is no empirical evidence 
that large welfare states make countries poorer in the sense of lowering national income per 
head of the population. Another reason is that countries with large welfare states typically 
introduce  many  pro-growth  policies  such  as  low  taxes  on  capital,  special  treatment  for 
corporations and more education subsidies. 
Social interactions and the effects of neighbours on individual behaviour are just as 
important for understanding the causes of unemployment (Akerlof, 1980; van de Klundert, 
1990) and welfare stigma (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1992; Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull,   29
1999). These insights are crucial for the design of an efficient welfare state. It is a mistake to 
think  that  all  interactions  between  people  are  mediated  through  the  price  and  wage 
mechanism alone. The individual’s voluntary choice between living on welfare and working 
depends  very  much  on  social  norms  and  interactions.  In  a  very  interesting  paper  Åberg, 
Hedström  and  Kolm  (2003)  study  the  social  and  psychological  costs  of  involuntary 
unemployment empirically and within the context of a search-theoretic model of the labour 
market. Examining the behaviour of young people in Stockholm, they find evidence that these 
costs are low if people live in a neighbourhood where many people are unemployed and vice 
versa. Consequently, there are ratchet effects in unemployment. If unemployment is high in 
an area, psychological costs of unemployment are low and thus people search less intensively 
for a new job and are more likely to become and remain unemployed themselves. Conversely, 
if unemployment is low, psychological costs of unemployment are high, people search harder 
for a new job, and unemployment is more likely to remain low. This work emphasises the 
importance of communities and of social norms in understanding unemployment and in the 
design of the welfare state. 
  It also matters for the welfare state what people believe are the rewards of effort, hard 
work and risk taking. If people think these activities lead to economic success, there is much 
less support for redistribution and the welfare state. If people are down and out after having 
tried  to  get  a  job  and  search  for  income,  there  is  much  more  support  for  redistribution. 
Fairness implies that society is much more willing to help those with bad luck than lazy 
people. Since many people care about relative incomes and are engaged in rat races, it makes 
sense for governments to have a higher tax rate and more redistribution simply to correct for 
the adverse externality of working too hard. Also, societies with a lot of inequality end up 
with populist governments who redistribute more than more equal societies. In the process 
such unequal societies end up with higher tax rates, higher unemployment, lower output and 
higher inflation. In sum, reciprocity, mutual obligations, sociological considerations, beliefs, 
procedural  fairness,  consumer  rivalry  and  the  theory  of  second  best  matter  for  a  better 
understanding  of  the  effects  of  the  welfare  state  on  employment  and  output.  This  has 
important implications for public finance and promises exciting venues for future research. 
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